SEIZURE

Culley v. Marshall

Issues

In post-seizure civil forfeiture proceedings, does due process require an additional “retention hearing” and in analyzing that question, should a district court apply Barker v. Wingo’s speedy-trial test, or the three-part analysis announced by Mathews v. Eldridge?

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance a civil forfeiture claimant’s due process rights against a state’s interests in forfeiture and procedural efficiency. Under Alabama state law, the State is required to file a motion for forfeiture proceedings promptly after the seizure of property. In the interim, the statute allows claimants to request return of property believed to be illegally seized, and to post a bond worth twice the value of the property. Lena Sutton and Halima Culley contend that Alabama violated their due process rights by failing to provide a retention hearing and urge the Court to apply the standard from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether Alabama’s civil forfeiture processes are sufficient. Steve T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, counters that due process does not require more than the State’s timely initiation of proceedings and thus urges the Court to apply the speedy-trial test from Barker v. Wingo. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the future of private property rights and state interests in civil asset forfeiture cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether district courts, in determining whether the due process clause requires a state or local government to provide a post-seizure probable-cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial-forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850 and Barker v. Wingo or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.

Petitioners Halima Culley and Lena Sutton both owned vehicles that were seized under Alabama laws which allow the state to hold, subject to civil forfeiture proceedings, property used to facilitate drug crimes. Culley v. Attorney Gen. at 2. On February 17, 2019, Culley’s son was pulled over while driving and arrested for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

Additional Resources

  • Lydia Wheeler, Car Seizures Are New Test for Justices on Property Rights, Bloomberg Law (April 17, 2023).
  • Marco Poggio, Justices to Hear Wheether Post-Seizure Hearings Are Required,
    Law360 (April 21, 2023).
  • John Sharp, Alabama Civil Asset Forfeiture Faces Consitutional Challenges as Lawmakers Ponder Reform, AL.com (October 07, 2019).
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Riley v. California

Issues

Does the Fourth Amendment permit police officers to perform a warrantless search of an individual’s cell phone confiscated at the time of an arrest?

In August 2009, David Riley was pulled over in San Diego, California for having expired tags on his car and a suspended driver’s license. As per police department policy, the officer impounded Riley’s car and conducted a warrantless search of the car. The officer found two handguns that were later linked to a shooting that had taken place a few weeks prior. During the arrest, the officers confiscated and rummaged through the data on Riley’s smartphone without a warrant. Some of the data on the phone linked Riley to gang activity and the shooting and was entered into evidence at the trial, where Riley was convicted on three charges. Riley argues that allowing police officers to search through data on his cell phone without a warrant is an unacceptable intrusion on personal privacy. California argues that police officers need to be able to confiscate cell phones without first obtaining a warrant for safety reasons and to prevent destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the balance between those two concerns and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection available to personal technology. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether or under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest.  

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Facts

On August 2, 2009 around 2:30 p.m., David Riley, an alleged member of the Lincoln Park gang, was parked in a San Diego neighborhood with his girlfriend and three other men. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 BL 34220, 2013 ILRC 1385 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Feb. 08, 2013) at 1. When a member of a rival gang, Mr.

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self-incrimination

Self-incrimination is the intentional or unintentional act of providing information that will suggest your involvement in a crime, or expose you to criminal prosecution.

Thompson v. Clark

Issues

Does the favorable termination element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure require a plaintiff to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that affirmatively indicates the plaintiff’s innocence?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the “favorable termination” element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure requires a petitioner to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that is consistent with his innocence. Petitioner Larry Thompson brought a Section 1983 claim against his arresting officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights after his criminal charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice,” with no further explanation regarding Thompson’s innocence or guilt. Thompson claims that his criminal proceedings terminated favorably, but Respondent Paigel Clark—an arresting police officer— argues that Thompson failed to meet this requirement, asserting that charges must be dismissed in a way that affirmatively indicates innocence. This case has important implications for the future of Section 1983 claims, prosecutorial discretion, and police officer accountability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls.

In January 2014, Petitioner Larry Thompson lived with his fiancé, their newborn child, and his fiancé’s sister, Camille Watson, in Brooklyn, New York. Thompson v. Clark at 182. One night, Watson noticed a rash on the newborn child and called 911 to report that Thompson was abusing his child. Id. When Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMT”) arrived, Thompson confronted them, telling them that no one in the apartment had called 911. Id.

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Torres v. Madrid

Issues

Under the Fourth Amendment, is an officer’s intentional use of physical force to apprehend an individual a “seizure” even where the individual escapes?

This case asks whether an officer’s intentional use of physical force to apprehend an individual constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the officer does not successfully detain the individual or limit her freedom of movement. Officers Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson temporarily paralyzed Roxanne Torres’s arm after striking it with two bullets as Torres drove at them. Torres argues that based on the common law meaning of the Fourth Amendment and on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, a person is seized where the officer intentionally applies physical force. Torres contends that although she drove over an hour away from the scene of where she was shot, the officers’ bullets striking her arm constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. Officers Madrid and Williamson counter that a Fourth Amendment physical-force seizure requires more. The officers maintain that to successfully complete a Fourth Amendment seizure, they would have had to intentionally acquire physical control, which did not occur because Torres fled from the scene. The outcome of this case has important implications for the balancing of interests respecting police conduct and public safety. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force is a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits and the New Mexico Supreme Court hold, or whether physical force must be successful in detaining a suspect to constitute a “seizure,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hold.

In July 2014, two police officers approached an apartment complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico to apprehend Kayenta Jackson, a suspected criminal. Torres v. Madrid at 1–2. The officers first noticed two individuals standing in front of Jackson’s apartment next to a car that was backed into a parking spot. Id. at 2. The officers approached the individuals in case one of them was Jackson. Id.

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